1908 United Mine Workers strike: Difference between revisions

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Unions had been hindered in their operations since the first days of industrialization in the Birmingham District. Mine operators had been successful in making the case that, although the mineral resources in the region were abundant, the development of local industry was completely dependent on the supply inexpensive labor. Labor organizers did make inroads and as many as 10,000 of the district's miners were on the rolls of the United Mine Workers by [[1900]]. In [[1903]], though, the [[Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company]] cut its ties with the UMW and initiated a policy of only hiring non-union workers. That policy continued when TCI was purchased by [[U.S. Steel]] in [[1907]]. With the power of the District's largest employer behind them, the other members of the newly-formed Alabama Coal Operators Association soon followed suit and, in June [[1908]], also insisted on forcing wage reductions on their existing workforce.
Unions had been hindered in their operations since the first days of industrialization in the Birmingham District. Mine operators had been successful in making the case that, although the mineral resources in the region were abundant, the development of local industry was completely dependent on the supply inexpensive labor. Labor organizers did make inroads and as many as 10,000 of the district's miners were on the rolls of the United Mine Workers by [[1900]]. In [[1903]], though, the [[Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company]] cut its ties with the UMW and initiated a policy of only hiring non-union workers. That policy continued when TCI was purchased by [[U.S. Steel]] in [[1907]]. With the power of the District's largest employer behind them, the other members of the newly-formed Alabama Coal Operators Association soon followed suit and, in June [[1908]], also insisted on forcing wage reductions on their existing workforce.


<!--District 20 declared a strike to commence on July 8, 1908, and the early momentum seemed to be with the union. Although only 4,000 of 20,000 miners walked out on the first day, by the end of the first week some 30 new union locals had been formed, and more than half the mine workforce had joined the walkout by the end of the second week. Among the miners newly organized into the union were a number of men who had been strikebreakers only several years earlier. In addition, the national press reported on the UMW's effectiveness in shutting down mine operations through mass picketing. A number of armed confrontations erupted between strikers and company guards: miners were convinced that the only effective way to win their strike was to shut down coal production; coal operators were determined to continue, even if it meant employing strikebreakers in place of their regular workforce. In these clashes, the union men seemed to be able to give as good as they got.
The UMW's membership declared a strike to begin on [[July 8]]. About 4,000 miners walked out on the first day, but soon more members joined the strike, swiftly forming new locals. By the end of the second week, more than half of all the district's coal miners, including many who had begun their careers as strike-breakers, were walking picket lines. As the strikers sought to shut down production, the owners deputized armed guards to evict them from company-owned housing and began bringing in replacements. With the union's help, homeless mining families moved into tent cities, guarded by their own members.


Convicts in their sleeping quarters in Birmingham in Convicts in Birmingham 1907By the end of July a sense of panic gripped district operators. The strike was more effective than they had anticipated, and the union seemed poised to win converts among workers in the largest mining operations. Mine owners resorted to a number of aggressive measures in their efforts to counter these developments, such as dispatching labor recruiters as far away as New York's Ellis Island to hire strikebreakers and increasing their use of unpaid convicts leased from the state to maintain coal production. Mine owners also deputized hundreds of armed men to confront the workers and urged Governor Braxton Bragg Comer to declare martial law and dispatch state troops into the coalfields, a request he eventually granted. In addition, owners and their supporters in Birmingham's business community openly advocated vigilantism and resorted increasingly to inflammatory rhetoric to rouse white Alabamians against the interracial UMW. The racial undercurrent of the public condemnation of the UMW became increasingly apparent after early August.
By the end of the month, the mine owners, seemingly in panic, sent agents further afield to seek replacements and expanded the [[Convict lease system|leasing of state convicts]], tantamount to slave labor. As August began, hundreds of company guards were placed into service to the companies, and a broad-based propaganda campaign focused attention on the fact that the UMW was a bi-racial union and that their potential success could begin undermining [[segregation]] in central Alabama. That message, made unmistakably visible by an integrated UMW-sponsored parade in [[Jasper]], helped inflame violent opposition to the unions. One black union member, [[William Millin]], was taken from prison in [[Brighton]] and [[lynching|lynched]] by company guards. Union members retaliated with more violence, threatening to turn the coal fields into a war zone.


Braxton Bragg Comer was the governor of Alabama Braxton Bragg ComerThe most remarkable feature of the strike was the union's ability to unite miners across the racial divide, a development that was unique not only for Birmingham, but for American society as a whole during this oppressive period in race relations. A parade of striking black and white miners through the streets of Jasper provoked fury among members of Birmingham's business community who warned the UMW that its policy of biracial organizing would ignite racial violence. Prominent mineowners denounced the UMW's interracial workforce as an insult to southern traditions, and called for armed state intervention against the racially mixed strikers. In mid-August, black UMW member William Millin was snatched from the jail at Brighton and lynched by two mine deputies, an outrage that provoked fierce, armed retaliation against company guards by a racially mixed group of union miners. The atmosphere seemed to portend more of such violence.
In late August Governor Comer, who had until then stayed out of the fray, agreed on [[August 26]] to send soldiers from the state militia to dismantle the striker's tent cities, under the pretense of protecting public health. With no means of sustaining the strike, the UMW conceded failure and ended the work-stoppage. The result was a total victory for mine owners, many of whom adopted "[[Progressivism|progressive]]" policies intended to bind workers and their families to the interests of the companies while rigidly enforcing racial segregation to reduce the threat of combined action.
 
The mine operators' increasingly strident appeals for forceful intervention, supported by lurid reports of "racial mixing" among striking miners in Birmingham's business press, eventually won over Governor Comer. In late August, he summoned UMW leaders to his office and warned that legislators would not tolerate what they perceived as efforts to promote equality among black and white miners. Union leaders denied such intentions, but their efforts were in vain. Under the guise of containing a public health nuisance, Comer ordered the military on August 26 to cut down the tent colonies that had become home to those strikers evicted from company housing. Four days later, union officials declared the strike over, and despite grass-roots efforts to continue the strike, the scale of the defeat was soon apparent. Mine owners, however, relished the new situation, confident that they could revitalize the coal industry on the basis of a more compliant workforce. One year later, the mines had returned to normal operations, and the miners' efforts toward labor reforms had ended in utter failure.-->


==References==
==References==

Revision as of 17:35, 12 December 2013

The 908 United Mine Workers strike was a major labor strike in the summer of 1908 involving some 18,000 coal miners, both black and white, on behalf of United Mine Workers District 20. The affected industries, organized as the Alabama Coal Operators Association, but colloquially known as the "Big Mules", got help from Governor B. B. Comer and the Alabama State Militia in successfully breaking the two month work stoppage. The union withdrew their demands in August. The defeat established an "open shop" environment in Alabama. It considerably weakened the influence of organized labor in the Birmingham District and undermined one of the first notable attempts to align the political fortunes of white and black Alabamians.

Unions had been hindered in their operations since the first days of industrialization in the Birmingham District. Mine operators had been successful in making the case that, although the mineral resources in the region were abundant, the development of local industry was completely dependent on the supply inexpensive labor. Labor organizers did make inroads and as many as 10,000 of the district's miners were on the rolls of the United Mine Workers by 1900. In 1903, though, the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company cut its ties with the UMW and initiated a policy of only hiring non-union workers. That policy continued when TCI was purchased by U.S. Steel in 1907. With the power of the District's largest employer behind them, the other members of the newly-formed Alabama Coal Operators Association soon followed suit and, in June 1908, also insisted on forcing wage reductions on their existing workforce.

The UMW's membership declared a strike to begin on July 8. About 4,000 miners walked out on the first day, but soon more members joined the strike, swiftly forming new locals. By the end of the second week, more than half of all the district's coal miners, including many who had begun their careers as strike-breakers, were walking picket lines. As the strikers sought to shut down production, the owners deputized armed guards to evict them from company-owned housing and began bringing in replacements. With the union's help, homeless mining families moved into tent cities, guarded by their own members.

By the end of the month, the mine owners, seemingly in panic, sent agents further afield to seek replacements and expanded the leasing of state convicts, tantamount to slave labor. As August began, hundreds of company guards were placed into service to the companies, and a broad-based propaganda campaign focused attention on the fact that the UMW was a bi-racial union and that their potential success could begin undermining segregation in central Alabama. That message, made unmistakably visible by an integrated UMW-sponsored parade in Jasper, helped inflame violent opposition to the unions. One black union member, William Millin, was taken from prison in Brighton and lynched by company guards. Union members retaliated with more violence, threatening to turn the coal fields into a war zone.

In late August Governor Comer, who had until then stayed out of the fray, agreed on August 26 to send soldiers from the state militia to dismantle the striker's tent cities, under the pretense of protecting public health. With no means of sustaining the strike, the UMW conceded failure and ended the work-stoppage. The result was a total victory for mine owners, many of whom adopted "progressive" policies intended to bind workers and their families to the interests of the companies while rigidly enforcing racial segregation to reduce the threat of combined action.

References

  • Lewis, Ronald L. (1987) Black Coal Miners in America: Race, Class and Community Conflict, 1780-1980. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press
  • Ward, Robert David and William Warren Rogers (1987) Convicts, Coal and the Banner Mine Tragedy. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press
  • Letwin, Daniel L.(1998) The Challenge of Interracial Unionism: Alabama Coal Miners, 1878-1921. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
  • Brown, Edwin L. and Colin J. David, eds. (1999) It is Union and Liberty: Alabama Coal Miners and the UMW. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press
  • Kelly, Brian (2001) Race, Class and Power in the Alabama Coalfields, 1908-1921. Urbana: University of Illinois Press
  • Kelly, Brian (May 13, 2011) "Birmingham District Coal Strike of 1908". Encyclopedia of Alabama - accessed December 12, 2013
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